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I. INTRODUCTION 
In 2007 the Commission fined several undertakings of the so-called elevator cartel.  
This Commission decision proved to be a goldmine for competition law scholars and 
lawyers: from the equality of arms and the effectiveness of private enforcement in Otis,1 
to the Schindler2 case in which the respective undertaking put forward 13 pleas alleging 
the infringement of its fundamental rights. Now a third case emerges which could have 
a major influence on the development of the enforcement of EU competition law, 
namely the Kone case.3 The Kone case deals with the so-called concept of “umbrella 
pricing”. Umbrella pricing is a concept that refers to the behaviour of non-cartel 
members who raise prices to align themselves with a cartel. This price increase occurs 
without any collusion between cartel members and non-cartel members.   
In the Kone case, ÖBB-Infrastruktur AG, a subsidiary of Austrian Federal Railways, 
claimed damages from the cartel members of the elevator cartel. Part of these damages 
resulted from the behaviour of the cartel members, whilst another substantial part, 
namely a part of €1.8 million, resulted from umbrella pricing. Austrian law requires an 
adequate causal link between an infringement and losses in order for a claim for 
damages to be successful. Umbrella pricing is, according to Austrian law, a mere 
indirect loss, which is not sufficient to provide for an adequate causal link. The national 
court was unsure about the lawfulness of exclusion of a causal link between umbrella 
pricing and damages and thus decided to refer a question to the Court of Justice.  
In the discussion below we will touch upon certain aspects of the Court’s ruling (often 
in conjunction with the Advocate General’s Opinion), that we consider important for 
the development of the law in the area of enforcing competition law rules. By no means 
is this analysis meant to be an exhaustive one. What can be read below pertains, in our 
opinion, to a set of questions in need of concrete answers; both as far as enforcers and 
market players (cartelists or not) are concerned. 
II. PROCEDURAL AUTONOMY 
The Judgment of the Court is for the first part not that innovative. Reference is made 
to the direct effect of Articles 101(1) and 102 TFEU and, in extension to that, the 
*  Marc Veenbrink is Junior Lecturer and Catalin S Rusu is Associate Professor at Radboud University 
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1  Case C-199/11 Europese Gemeenschap v Otis NV and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2012:684. 
2  Case C-501/11P Schindler Holding Ltd and Others v European Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2013:522. 
3  Case C-557/12 Kone AG and Others v ÖBB Infrastruktur AG, ECLI:EU:C:2014:1317. 
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possibility for every individual to claim damages for loss caused by an infringement 
those articles. The underlying reason, as recalled by the Court, is to ensure the 
effectiveness of EU competition law. In previous case law4 the Court has made clear 
that every individual should have the right to claim damages when three conditions are 
met; there should be a loss, occurred due to an infringement of the EU competition 
rules and there should be a causal link between the two. These concepts, however, are 
not further elaborated upon by the Court. Several authors have pointed out the lack of 
clarity created by not interpreting these constituent elements of the right to claim 
damages for EU competition law infringements.5 In the case at hand the Court decided 
to fill in some of these blanks. According to the Court, two conditions should be met in 
order to establish the causal link between the infringement of the EU competition rules 
and losses by umbrella pricing. First of all, it should be:  
“established that the cartel at issue was, in the circumstances of the case and, in 
particular, the specific aspects of the relevant market, liable to have the effect of 
umbrella pricing being applied by third parties acting independently”.6  
Secondly, “those circumstances and specific aspects could not be ignored by the 
members of that cartel”.7 A categorical exclusion of liability of cartel members for 
umbrella pricing, as was the case in Austria, is thus prohibited.8 As will be explained 
below, we believe that the first condition is met quite easily. All cartels do have a certain 
degree of market power, otherwise it would not be sensible to create a cartel. It is 
therefore not just merely a possibility, but probably likely, that the market 
circumstances are as such that umbrella pricing could occur. The second condition 
provides that cartel members could not have ignored the specific market circumstances 
which increase the likelihood of umbrella pricing to occur. In our opinion, as will be 
explained below, this should be interpreted as such that cartel members should have 
been aware of the likelihood of umbrella pricing. This can be regarded as a rebuttable 
presumption of causality between an infringement of Article 101(1) TFEU and losses 
suffered by umbrella pricing. The Court has thus conceptualized the requirement of a 
causal link specifically for umbrella pricing. One could wonder whether by doing so the 
Court overstepped its boundaries set in the Courage/Crehan9 and Manfredi10 cases. In 
those cases the Court ruled that, in the absence of harmonization, Member States are 
4  Case C-453/99, Courage Ltd v Bernard Crehan and Bernard Crehan v Courage Ltd and Others, [2001] 
ECLI:EU:C:2001:465; see also Joined cases C-295/04 to C-298/04, Vincenzo Manfredi v Lloyd Adriatico 
Assicurazioni SpA, Antonio Cannito v Fondiaria Sai SpA and Nicolò Tricarico and Pasqualina Murgolo v Assitalia SpA, 
[2006] ECLI:EU:C:2006:461. 
5  A. Jones and B. Sufrin, EU Competition Law. Text, Cases and Materials, 5th ed, Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 2014, p.1105. Van Gerven, ‘Crehan and the way ahead’ (2006) 17(2) EBLR 273; Stuyck ‘Case note to 
case C-453/99 Courage v Crehan’ (2005) 1(2) ERCL 234. 
6  At para 34. 
7  Ibid. 
8  Ibid, para 33. 
9  Case C-453/99, Courage Ltd v Bernard Crehan and Bernard Crehan v Courage Ltd and Others, [2001] 
ECLI:EU:C:2001:465.  
10  Joined cases C-295/04 to C-298/04, Vincenzo Manfredi v Lloyd Adriatico Assicurazioni SpA, Antonio Cannito v 
Fondiaria Sai SpA and Nicolò Tricarico and Pasqualina Murgolo v Assitalia SpA, [2006] ECLI:EU:C:2006:461. 
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free to create rules governing the exercise of the right to claim damages11 which 
includes rules “on the application of the concept of ‘causal relationship’”.12   
Member States are, on one hand, obliged to arrange the possibility to claim damages for 
an infringement of the EU competition rules, whilst, on the other hand, the exercise of 
the right to claim such damages can be arranged by the Member States themselves. Van 
Gerven refers to this distinction as the distinction between rights and remedies on one 
hand, and procedures on the other.13 The exercise of the right to claim damages14 is 
part of the procedural autonomy of Member States and therefore bound by the limits 
provided for by the principles of equivalence and effectiveness. Whilst the Court does 
not deal explicitly with the distinction between the existence of a right or the exercise 
of that right, AG Kokott does refer to this distinction. She argues that:  
“the civil liability of cartel members for umbrella pricing is [...] a matter of 
European Union law. After all, if there is a need to assess whether the members of 
a cartel have to make good loss sustained as a result of umbrella pricing, that 
assessment will not only be concerned with the rules for enforcing and calculating 
compensation claims and the furnishing of evidence before national courts (in 
other words, the ‘how’ of the compensation). The focus of interest of such an 
assessment will, rather, be the much more fundamental question of whether cartel 
members can be held civilly liable at all for this kind of loss and whether they can 
be sued by persons who are not their direct or indirect customers (that is to say, 
the ‘whether’ of compensation). That question cannot be left to the legal orders of 
the Member States alone”.15 
It appears that the Court, while reaching the same result as the AG on this matter, takes 
a different path. The rules governing the causality requirement form apparently part of 
the procedural autonomy of the Member States.16 However, the Court continues by 
stating that Member States are bound by the principle of effectiveness. To ensure the 
11  Case C-453/99, Courage Ltd v Bernard Crehan and Bernard Crehan v Courage Ltd and Others, [2001] 
ECLI:EU:C:2001:465, par. 29; Joined cases C-295/04 to C-298/04, Vincenzo Manfredi v Lloyd Adriatico 
Assicurazioni SpA, Antonio Cannito v Fondiaria Sai SpA and Nicolò Tricarico and Pasqualina Murgolo v Assitalia SpA, 
[2006] ECLI:EU:C:2006:461, par. 64. 
12  Joined cases C-295/04 to C-298/04, Vincenzo Manfredi v Lloyd Adriatico Assicurazioni SpA, Antonio Cannito v 
Fondiaria Sai SpA and Nicolò Tricarico and Pasqualina Murgolo v Assitalia SpA, [2006] ECLI:EU:C:2006:461, par. 
64. 
13 Van Gerven, ‘Of rights, remedies and procedures’ (2000) 37(3) CMLRev 503: “The concept of right refers, 
[according to Van Gerven,] to a legal position which a person recognized as such by the law [...] may have 
and which in its normal state can be enforced by that person against (some or all) others before a court of 
law by means of one or more remedies, those are classes of action, intended to make good infringements of 
the rights concerned, in accordance with procedures governing the exercise of such classes of action and 
intended to make the remedy concerned operational.” 
14  Or in the wording of Van Gerven: procedures fall under the procedural autonomy of Member States, whilst 
the creation of rights and remedies is for the Union to determine.  
15  AG Kokott’s Opnion, ECLI:EU:C:2014:45, par. 28. 
16  This is in line with the reasoning in the Manfredi case: Joined cases C-295/04 to C-298/04, Vincenzo Manfredi v 
Lloyd Adriatico Assicurazioni SpA, Antonio Cannito v Fondiaria Sai SpA and Nicolò Tricarico and Pasqualina Murgolo v 
Assitalia SpA, [2006] ECLI:EU:C:2006:461, par. 64. 
(2010) 10(1) CompLRev 109 
                                                                                                                                         
Case Comment - Kone 
full effectiveness of Article 101 TFEU the Court found it necessary to fill in the 
concept of the causal link.  
The reasoning of the Court could, in our opinion, lead to confusion. The question 
whether a person has the right to claim damages resulting from umbrella pricing is at 
the core of the right to claim damages17 and thus deals with the existence of such a right. 
Filling in the concept of causality is therefore not part of the procedural autonomy and 
should thus be governed by EU law.18 The Court has, unfortunately, missed an 
opportunity to provide more guidance on the interpretation of the conditions of 
liability for EU competition law infringements. 
III. EXPECTATIONS OF UMBRELLA EFFECTS 
Economic theory suggests that certain markets may be particularly prone to the 
occurrence of umbrella effects. In this respect, transparency, a limited number of 
market players and product homogeneity are circumstances that may be conducive to 
such effects. Umbrella pricing is an example of effects occurring outside the vertical 
chain of product distribution. The impact of cartelisation can also be felt by producers 
of complementary products to the cartelised products. AG Kokott also points out in 
para 32 of the Opinion that cartels are capable of causing considerable economic 
damage not only in the narrower sphere of the cartel’s members, but far beyond. What 
is more, certain opinions point to the fact that, especially in highly concentrated 
markets, umbrella effects as a result of a cartel are theoretically unavoidable.19 This is 
because the cartel itself increases demand for non-cartelised products, which in turn 
creates an incentive for the non-cartelists to raise prices close to the level of the cartel 
price. Of course, the seriousness of these umbrella effects depends on various 
circumstances, such as the strength of existing competitive constraints, the 
concentration levels in the market, the type of product market dealt with, the amount 
of market output that the cartelists and non-cartelists can produce, etc. What is 
interesting to investigate is how to translate this economic evidence in legal terms, 
especially when talking about causality and the expectations of cartelists of umbrella 
effects being created. 
The matter at hand has to be discussed in the context of a market power analysis. 
Undertakings will only engage in a cartel if they can attach sufficient market power to it. 
In other words, by engaging in a cartel the cartelists will alter the existing competitive 
constraints in their favour. With this comes the expected consequence that, “the 
stronger the cartel’s position is on the market concerned, the more likely it is that the 
17  Cf. P. Craig and G. De Búrca, EU Law. Text, Cases and Materials, 5th ed, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
2011, p. 251, mention, with regard to state liability: “while the core conditions of the principle of (state) 
liability for breach of EU law are determined by EU law, the action for compensation is provided within the 
framework of domestic legal systems, with varying procedural and substantive rules on matters such as time 
limits, causation, mitigation of loss, and assessment of damages.” 
18  Cf. Van Gerven, ‘Of rights, remedies and procedures’ (2000) 37(3) CMLRev 526-527. 
19  R. Inderst, F. Maier-Rigaud and U. Schwalbe, ‘Umbrella Effects’, Forthcoming - Journal of Competition Law 
and Economics, 2014, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2297399 (accessed on 14 July 
2014). 
  (2014) 10(1) CompLRev 110 
                                                                                                                                         
  Marc Veenbrink & Catalin S Rusu 
cartel will have a significant impact on the pricing levels on that market as a whole”.20 
In such a setting, one may think that it is of little concern to the cartelists if the non-
cartelists free ride on the market circumstances created in the cartelised market, and 
increase prices under the protection of the umbrella effect. This is because, due to the 
absence of market power in the hands of the non-cartelists, the cartel’s objectives are 
unlikely to be jeopardized. However, there are strong reasons for the cartelists to 
appreciate the fact that non-cartelists are raising their prices too; as the more prices rise 
as a whole, the easier it will be for the cartelists to set their price as the ‘market price’ in 
the long-run, thus becoming, as Vedder correctly points out, barometric price leaders.21 
Additionally the non-cartelists do have an incentive to take profit from the umbrella 
effect that is created. Also, if sufficient market power is attached to the cartel, there is 
less scope for a non-cartelist to have any meaningful influence of its own over the 
market price. Therefore, it is not surprising that non-cartelists will act upon the market 
opportunities created, with a view to their profit-maximizing strategy.22 This line of 
reasoning echoed in the AG’s Opinion leads to the conclusion that umbrella pricing is 
not a “side-effect” of the cartel,23 and that, “any loss the incurrence of which the cartel 
members ought reasonably to take into consideration on the basis of practical 
experience is foreseeable”.24 To our mind, this seems to be (almost) bordering a non-
rebuttable presumption of umbrella effects occurring and consequently loss resulting 
out of such a setting. Economic theory points to this conclusion too.  
The Court however, prefers a more cautious line of reasoning, by stating in par. 34 of 
the ruling that the market circumstances “could not be ignored” by the cartelists. When 
talking about the plausibility of umbrella effects occurring, the Court notes that: such 
effects are one of the possible consequences of a cartel,25 it cannot be ruled out that 
non-cartelists will raise prices at a level higher than in the absence of the cartel,26 and 
the resulting loss cannot be disregarded by the cartelists.27 In our opinion the Court, 
while endorsing the AG’s rationale to a certain extent, does not fully embark on the 
same analysis and conclusions reached by the AG. We state this having in mind the 
difference in assertiveness between the AG’s Opinion and the Court’s ruling. While the 
AG seems to advocate for a strong presumption of umbrella effects occurring in a 
cartelized market of the type at issue in the present case, the Court chooses not to seal 
the discussion that easily. We believe that this is so because the Court opted for a 
formulation that seems less powerful. What may be drawn from the Court’s line of 
reasoning and language is that we should not frame the discussion in terms of a non-
20  AG Opinion, n 15, par. 47. 
21  H. Vedder, ‘The Kone Case and the Lifts Cartel – An Upward Effect on Prices and Effectiveness?’, 
European Law Blog, http://europeanlawblog.eu/?p=2397 (accessed on 12 July 2014). 
22  See AG Opinion, n 15, par. 46, 47, 50. 
23  Ibid, par. 43, 44. 
24  Ibid, Par. 42. 
25  Kone, n 3, par. 28. 
26  Ibid, par. 29. 
27  Ibid, par. 30. 
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rebuttable presumption of umbrella effects occurring and loss resulting in such market 
circumstances. The wording “could not be ignored” seems to point to much less than 
that. Perhaps a more appropriate middle ground could be found. We argue that it may 
have been more suitable for the Court to frame the matter as somewhat of a stronger 
statement than just “could not be ignored”: cartelists should have been aware of such 
consequences occurring in the market. This may potentially be viewed as a rebuttable 
presumption, with the emphasis being shifted towards the cartelists having to prove 
that umbrella effects were unforeseeable. This line of reasoning and formulation would 
be more consistent with the evidence stemming from economic theory, and in keeping 
with the discussion on the non-cartelists’ incentives, provided above. It may be that the 
Court deliberately avoided such an approach, in order not pass too conclusive a 
judgment on the balance between the private enforcement and the public enforcement 
tools of competition law; having in mind the burden of proof placed on the cartelists’ 
shoulders. According to par. 34 of the Judgment the core of the analysis is deferred to 
the domestic ambit. One should expect further questions to be raised in connection 
with how strong of a presumption the umbrella effects theory entails. 
IV. PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT V LENIENCY PROGRAMMES  
One of the arguments discussed by the undertakings concerned deals with the 
interaction between damage claims and leniency programmes in general within the EU.28 
The possibility for umbrella pricing to form a causal link might dissuade undertakings 
from participating in leniency programmes. A broadening of the group of persons who 
can claim damages, might thus produce a chilling effect on the public enforcement of 
EU competition law. 
The Court only refers to the leniency programme of the Commission and rules, with 
reference to the Pfleiderer case:29 that the “leniency programme [of the Commission] 
cannot deprive individuals of the right to obtain compensation before the national 
courts for loss sustained as a result of an infringement of Article 101 TFEU”.30 This 
short phrase only refers to the leniency programme of the Commission, but not to 
leniency programmes in general. AG Kokott, on the other hand, does refer to leniency 
programmes in general. In her opinion “it makes sense to provide cartel members with 
a smooth road back to legality in the form of leniency programmes and to help uncover 
infringements, provided that this is not at the expense of other economic operators’ 
legitimate interests”.31 It appears thus that AG Kokott favours private enforcement 
over the leniency programmes. The Court has used more subtle phrasing, although 
stimulating private enforcement is high on the Court’s agenda and the possibility of the 
chilling effect on leniency applicants cannot preclude private action damages.  
In our opinion it is striking that the Court only dealt shortly with the chilling effect on 
the public enforcement of EU competition law by allowing umbrella pricing to form a 
28  AG Opinion, n 15, par. 62. 
29  Case C-360/09, Pfleiderer AG v BundesKartellamt, [2011] ECLI:EU:C:2011:389. 
30  Kone, n 3, par. 36. 
31  AG Opinion, n 15, par. 63. 
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sufficient causal link for private damage claims. In the past the Court has strongly 
emphasized the importance of leniency programmes. In the Donau Chemie case, for 
example, the Court ruled that:  
“generalised access [to leniency documents] is also liable to adversely affect public 
interests, such as the effectiveness of anti-infringement policies in the area of 
competition law, because it could deter parties involved in infringements of 
Articles 101 TFEU and 102 TFEU from cooperating with the competition 
authorities”.32  
The Court has also made clear that leniency programmes are “useful tools” to ensure 
compliance with the EU competition rules.33 Setting aside leniency, as the Court does 
in the current Judgment, in favour of the right to claim damages might therefore be 
detrimental to the public enforcement of EU competition law. The approach of the 
Court might even lead to a conflict with the current approach of the Commission; 
which regards leniency programmes as of utmost importance for the public 
enforcement of the EU competition rules. Access to leniency documents should for 
example always be declined according to the Commission in order to protect the public 
enforcement of competition law.34 Furthermore, immunity recipients should be 
protected against “undue exposure to damages claims”35 and thus liability for immunity 
recipients is mainly excluded in private damage actions.36 The short response of the 
Court on the argument of the undertakings may thus not be conform the approach 
which the Commission is currently taking. It will be up to the two Union institutions to 
find some common ground in the clash between private and public enforcement of EU 
competition law in order to provide legal certainty for undertakings, national 
competition authorities and domestic courts.   
V. CONSEQUENCES FOR CARTELISTS AND NON-CARTELISTS 
The ruling in Kone seems to have changed the recipe of the ‘prisoner’s dilemma’ 
formula. Now, cartelists have to balance the profitability of their anticompetitive 
behaviour not only with the chances of being caught, the benefits and incentives to 
confess, and the potentially large amounts they will have to pay to their clients (via 
damages claims), but also with potentially covering the damages claims arising as a 
result of accepting the umbrella pricing theory. As shown above, and as correctly 
pointed out by Vedder,37 one can imagine that the benefits of leniency (immunity) and 
the threat of potentially more costly damage claims will be perceived differently by 
32  Case C-536/11, Bundeswettbewerbsbehörde v Donau Chemie AG and Others, [2013] ECLI:EU:C:2013:366, par. 33. 
33  Case C-360/09, Pfleiderer AG v BundesKartellamt, [2011] ECLI:EU:C:2011:389, par. 25; Case C-536/11, 
Bundeswettbewerbsbehörde v Donau Chemie AG and Others, [2013] ECLI:EU:C:2013:366, par. 42. 
34  Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on certain rules governing actions for damages 
under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States and of the 
European Union of 9 April 2014, COM(2013)0404, preamble 24 and Article 6(6)(a). 
35  Ibid, preamble 32.  
36  Ibid, Article 11(3). 
37  H. Vedder, ‘The Kone Case and the Lifts Cartel – An Upward Effect on Prices and Effectiveness?’, 
European Law Blog, http://europeanlawblog.eu/?p=2397 (accessed on 12 July 2014). 
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cartelists. But what are the cartelists to do in such a setting? How should they react to 
the Kone ruling placing an even more costly burden on their shoulders?  
It is imaginable that it is not pleasant to pay for somebody else’s profit, and in this 
respect cartelists may want to involve those competitors not party to the cartel in the 
anti-competitive behaviour. By doing this, the cartelists will rebalance the prisoner’s 
dilemma mix. The expected damages claims that now fall under the umbrella effect 
(and have to be satisfied by the cartelists) will be redirected to the non-cartelists drawn 
into anti-competitiveness. The clients of these (previous) non-cartelists will have a 
claim for damages directly to their sellers, who are now also engaged in the anti-
competitive behaviour. Thus, reliance on the umbrella effects theory is not necessary 
anymore for the injured parties. Causality will also be easier to prove, and overall the 
claimant will face a less severe uphill battle. To depict how cartelists may draw non-
cartelists into anti-competitiveness in practice, one may imagine a cartel between A, B 
and C, whereas D and E are those competitors protected by the umbrella effect. Should 
A inform D and E, via an email for example, about A’s pricing tactics, this will place D 
and E in a rather difficult position; if they choose to adjust their prices accordingly 
(thus benefiting from the umbrella effect), this may amount to a concerted practice. D 
and E will not then be able to claim they were not aware of the existence of anti-
competitiveness in the market. The market conduct that will follow will bring them in 
the realm of anti-competitiveness too.38 Thus, the choice that D and E will have is 
either to maintain their prices, or to leave the market.  
The above setting will also seal the matter of the rather odd formulation in AG 
Kokott’s Opinion, relating to the non-cartelists raising their prices “knowingly or 
unknowingly”.39 In this respect, Sánchez Graells40 has also pointed out some of the 
problems of the framework of analysis in the AG’s Opinion. If the non-cartelist is not 
aware of the cartel’s existence, it will adjust its prices according to the existing market 
conditions (albeit they are distorted). Accordingly, there should be little scope of 
intervention for competition law. However, if the non-cartelist is not “innocent”, then 
the increase in price will amount to a concerted practice, thus making it liable for the 
resulting damages. Whether this “guilt” of the (previous) non-cartelists is triggered by 
the cartelists (see the email example above), or not, this may definitely warrant further 
discussion on how independent the non-cartelists’ market decisions are.  
To complete the puzzle above, and also to relate it to the AG’s colourful arguments on 
the so-called “black sheep undertakings”,41 the non-cartelists do have a third choice 
besides increasing prices and leaving the market; namely, signalling to the competent 
38  Case C-199/92, Hüls AG v Commission, [1999] ECLI:EU:C:1999:358 and case C-8/08, T-Mobile Netherlands 
BV and Others v Raad van bestuur van de Nederlandse Mededingingsautoriteit, [2009] ECLI:EU:C:2009:343. 
39  AG Opinion, n 15, par. 2. 
40 A. Sánchez Graells, ‘A first reaction to AG Kokott's KONE Opinion (C-557/12)’, How to Crack a Nut, 
http://howtocrackanut.blogspot.co.uk/2014/02/a-first-reaction-to-ag-kokotts-kone.html (accessed on 12 
July 2014). 
41  AG Opinion, n 15, par. 68. 
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competition authorities the existence of anti-competitiveness in the market they are 
active in. Would this be a rational approach on behalf of the non-cartelists? 
On one hand, if the non-cartelists are “innocent” there is little incentive to step 
forward. This is because should the cartel raise prices, the umbrella effect that is created 
allows the non-cartelists to follow suit, with no consequences as far as the likelihood of 
the non-cartelists having to pay damages. Any rational, profit-maximising firm will not 
pass on an opportunity to increase its price, granted its costs remain the same. The Kone 
ruling does not address the issue of such incentives. What is more, by accepting the 
umbrella effect theory, nothing has changed as far as the incentives afforded to the 
non-cartelists are concerned. This may be regarded as a missed opportunity on behalf 
of the Court: not only that non-cartelists will not be encouraged to unveil the wrong 
doings of the cartelists, but further protection regarding their liability is conferred. 
On the other hand, if cartelist like A, above, sends the above mentioned email, if D and 
E continue to stay in that market, and if their prices are increased, they will be held 
liable just like A, B and C. This may be easily viewed as a textbook concerted practice. 
Consequently, one may draw the conclusion that the Kone ruling provides more 
incentives to cartelists to attract others into anti-competitiveness, than confessing and 
thus breaking up the cartel. Additionally, this ruling places non-cartelists in a position 
they most certainly did not demand to be in, should the cartelists act deviously with a 
view to expand their anti-competitive conduct. 
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
We do not claim to have discussed all issues which this Judgment raises, nor shall we 
summarize our preceding arguments. It should, however, be mentioned that the Court 
has left us with more questions than answers in this Judgment. The Court could have 
used this opportunity to explain the conditions for liability of anti-competitive 
behaviour. It appears that the Court favours the importance of private enforcement of 
EU competition law over public enforcement, although it has carefully phrased its 
ruling. The cautious approach of the Court in this sensitive area is admirable, but it 
does lead to more questions; questions which will hopefully be raised by national courts 
in the near future.  
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